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ABSTRACT 
The United States (U.S.) and Mexico are more than neighbors sharing a common 
border. Since 1994, their economies have become more interdependent than ever by the 
entry into force of the North Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which made Mexico the 
United States’ third-largest trading partner. In spite of growing economic and social 
interdependence, the reality is that bilateral military cooperation remains limited, with the 
armed forces of both countries rarely interacting with each other. Why are the U.S. and 
Mexican militaries so distant? Why is Mexico a U.S. economic partner, but not a military 
ally? This study analyzes U.S.-Mexico relations from an historical perspective and 
assesses how bilateral military cooperation has evolved since World War II. It finds that 
common threats and growing economic interdependence cannot account for the absence 
of military-to-military cooperation. Instead, different military mission sets, divergent 
orientations and the absence of civilian control in Mexico imposes significant obstacles to 
improving military relations with the United States. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the 1990s, a quantitative and qualitative shift has occurred in economic 
relations between Canada, Mexico and the United States (U.S.) through the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA has led to a much deeper level of 
economic and social integration between neighbors, especially in terms of U.S.-Mexico 
relations. Nevertheless, in spite of this economic partnership, Mexico and the United 
States are far from being military allies. Since NAFTA was signed in 1994, the United 
States and Mexico have rarely developed institutional links in the military domain, with 
few bilateral military agreements and no formal alliances between these two neighbors. 
Why have these two countries been so distant in their military relations, while being so 
close in economic and social terms? Why have these two economic partners been unable 
to become military allies? Why is military cooperation with Mexico so difficult to 
achieve? 
B.  IMPORTANCE  
The puzzle described above can be justified in empirical and theoretical grounds. 
Empirically speaking, the United States and Mexico share the “world’s longest 
continuous international divide between a super power and a developing nation.”1 
According to the International Boundary and Water Commission, the border between the 
United States and Mexico is 1,954 miles long,2 and it shares 50 existing border 
crossings.3 Border crossings by personal vehicles, pedestrians, trucks, and trains totaled 
                                                 
1 Fernando Romero, Hyper-Border, The Contemporary, U.S.-Mexico Border and Its Future (New 
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008), 42. 
2 International Boundary and Water Commission, http://www.ibwc.state.gov/ (accessed September 
2009). 
3 Romero, Hyper-Border, The Contemporary, U.S.-Mexico Border and Its Future, 51. 
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approximately 138.6 million in 2008.4 Additionally, strong social and economic bonds 
exist between these two countries, since Mexico is the United States’ second most 
important export partner (13.3% of all U.S. exports go to Mexico, second only to Canada 
with 23%).5 Furthermore, the largest Mexican Diaspora lives in the United States, which 
only increases the ties between both countries. Almost 13% (12.5%) of the U.S. 
population is Hispanic, of which approximately 9% is Mexican-American, making this 
the largest minority group in America.6 Consequently, Mexico is strategic to U.S. 
interests, not only because of its economic importance, but also since both nations are 
socially integrated. 
More intriguing, the levels of bilateral cooperation in issues other than military 
affairs have increased substantially since the entry into force of NAFTA. Interestingly 
enough, trade relations between the two countries have been formalized in an 
international agreement and the two countries have a number of bilateral institutions to 
mediate when a conflict arises. Nevertheless, such levels of institutionalization are not 
evident in the military domain. This is a rather puzzling fact, especially when comparing 
U.S.-Mexico relations with, for instance, U.S.-Canada or U.S.-U.K. relations, where 
concomitant levels of cooperation exist both in the military and economic domains, 
through institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). This, in turn, raises the 
question of why Mexico and the United States seem unwilling to cooperate in the military 
domain, while they remain as strong economic partners. Empirically speaking, this is 
puzzling since no other major U.S. economic partner is as distant in military terms as 
Mexico is today. 
Theoretically speaking, the U.S.-Mexico case appears puzzling also. For years, 
both liberals and realists have explained international institutions and cooperation among 
                                                 
4 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Border Crossing Data, 
http://www.TranStats.bts.gov/BorderCrossing.aspx (accessed September 2009). 
5 Romero, Hyper-Border, The Contemporary, U.S.-Mexico Border and Its Future, 55. 
6 U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-
ds_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_&-redoLog=false&-mt_name=ACS_2006_EST_G2000_B03001 
(accessed September 2009). 
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states through various mechanisms. From a neo-liberal perspective, formal cooperation 
arises when countries can identify the benefits of cooperation; in other words, when they 
can overcome collective action and relative gain problems.7 In many ways, Mexico and 
the United States would actually benefit from such mechanisms by signing agreements 
and establishing a formal institution in the military domain. For instance, cooperating 
with the NORAD might help both countries overcome their mutual suspicions, while 
dealing with common security challenges, especially on the southern border. Yet, despite 
the many incentives for cooperation, Mexico and the United States have rarely shared 
common military institutions. In fact, the last time the two countries signed a military 
agreement was during World War II, when the Mexican government authorized U.S. 
bomber planes to land at Mexican airports on the way to Panama. At that time, radar 
systems were established on Mexican territory, and most importantly, a limited number 
of U.S. military personnel—in most cases without uniforms—were allowed to enter the 
country.8 
Likewise, realism argues that alliances are formed when countries face common 
threats—the larger the threat, the more likely that they can balance against a common 
enemy. While this provides for a strong explanation of the 1941 and 1945 levels of 
military cooperation, it is still necessary to explain why both countries did not cooperate 
militarily in the aftermath of WW II and in the post-Cold War era. Clearly, both countries 
faced common threats emanating from the Soviet Union, guerrilla movements, drug 
trafficking and now terrorism. Yet, the levels of military cooperation between both 
countries have been insignificant at best. 
Consequently, U.S.-Mexico military relations pose a number of theoretical 
questions as to what enables neighboring states to cooperate in the military domain. 
Neither neoliberalism, focused on mutual gains, nor neorealism, focused on mutual 
threats, seem to explain why Mexico and the United States have rarely cooperated with  
 
                                                 
7 “Six Decades of Multilateral Trade: What We Have Learnt? The Economics and Political Economy 
of International Trade Cooperation,” World Trade Report 2007 (December 2007): 93. 
8 Maria Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies, Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II (The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 6. 
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each other in military terms. In other words, why have Mexico and the United States 
shown relatively low levels of cooperation, in spite of the incentives to work together and 
in the face of common threats? 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the literature examined for this study confirms military cooperation with 
Mexico is almost non-existent, aside from a small number of military sales and joint 
training programs.9 Mexico’s resistance to cooperate with the United States can be 
attributed to several factors. Indeed, the existing literature covers multiple approaches 
and offers diverse, if not incompatible, diagnoses of the bilateral relationship. From an 
historical perspective, most studies available on U.S.-Mexico security relations have 
focused on the role of nationalism and ideology in determining both cooperation and 
conflict. For instance, it is often argued that Mexico’s resistance to cooperate with the 
United States is rooted in its recent history of interventions and dual conflict. Throughout 
the 19th century, Mexico lost more than half of its territory during the Mexican-American 
War of 1846–48. “The U.S. territories of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, 
California, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming were all once part of Mexico.”10 The 
early 20th century did not modify the status of the relationship; characterized by mutual 
resentment, since then President Woodrow Wilson authorized a military intervention in 
the port of Veracruz in 1914.11 From this perspective, the legacies of past wars exercise 
an influence on today’s bilateral relations, as evidenced in Mexico’s nationalistic rhetoric 
and in its excessive defense of non-intervention.12  
 
                                                 
9 J. Burkett, “Opening the Mexican Door: Continental Defense Cooperation” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005), 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Stephen I. Schwab, “The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, 
Limited, but Symbolically Significant,” The Journal of Military History 66, no. 4 (October 2002): 1115–
1140, http://www.jstore.org/stable/3093266 (accessed February 12, 2009). 
12 Ibid. 
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A second approach available in the literature stresses cultural perception and 
misperception as a driving force behind conflict cooperation among states. For instance, 
Mark Heredia argues that United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) staff 
members have unproven ideas as to the secrecy that surrounds the Mexican Army. 
During one of Heredia’s interviews, a NORTHCOM civilian described the relationship as 
a: 
. . . cultural thing . . . the U.S. perception of a lack of cooperation because 
of the historical legacy going back to 1848 . . . a pervasive theory. The 
U.S. thinks that the Mexicans hold a grudge. What about the Mexicans? 
Thinking as a Mexican—don’t trust the U.S. because the U.S. always acts 
in its own self-interests. Why should I [Mexican] help the U.S.? What’s in 
it for me? The U.S. regards Mexico as a third-world country and a banana 
republic. The U.S. attitude is that Mexico needs help. The Mexican’s see 
themselves as independent, but they see the U.S. attitude as an 
impediment.13 
Another NORTHCOM civilian speaks of the Mexican nationalist legacy and then links 
this to attitudes towards military cooperation:  
Mexican society and military cultural issues are the big obstacle. Mexico 
is trapped in its burden of history . . . eleven invasions . . . there is a slide 
showing Mexico under NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility in the 
command briefing that we do not show to the Mexicans.14 
As John A. Cope argues: 
Deep Mexican aversion to outside scrutiny and the absence of 
transparency in their domestic policy making make Mexicans’ views on 
improving military-to-military relations difficult to determine. In addition, 
a cultural veil of secrecy traditionally conceals the thinking of both the 
Mexican armed forces and Foreign Ministry on issues related to national 
security.15 
                                                 
13 Mark L. Heredia, “North America Security Cooperation: Prospects for Growth” (PhD diss., 
University of Denver, 2006), 72–73. 
14 Ibid. 
15 John A. Cope, “In Search of Convergence: U.S.-Mexican Military Relations into the Twenty-first 
Century,” in Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations beyond the Cold War, ed. John Bailey and 
Sergio Aguayo Quezada (San Diego: University of California-San Diego, 1996), 180.  
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While these two approaches provide insights about Mexico’s skepticism towards the 
United States, they are insufficient to explain the lack of military cooperation among both 
neighbors. Mexico’s strong nationalist feelings and historical legacies did not prevent 
Mexican authorities from signing a NAFTA in 1994. If anything, the increasing levels of 
cooperation witnessed in other policy domains indicates that nationalism is not an 
obstacle to bilateral cooperation. Thus, why is cooperation more likely in the economic 
realm than in the military domain? Nationalism and historical legacies should affect both 
policy realms, as social and historical trends equally influence them. 
A third factor available the literature on U.S.-Mexico relations focuses on military 
structures, particularly the U.S. defense organization, which is structurally different from 
Mexico’s. For instance, Mexico’s Secretary of Defense has been traditionally a four-star 
general, which is in contrast to the U.S. structure, where a civilian leads defense policy. 
This has important consequences on the way both authorities interact. Since the 
placement of Canada and Mexico within NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), 
Mexico’s Secretary of Defense is expected to work in tandem with NORTHCOM 
command, as opposed to dealing directly with his counterpart, the Secretary of Defense. 
This unorthodox structure promotes asymmetric relations among authorities and is the 
source of resentment within Mexico military institutions. As Mark Heredia argues, “this 
makes the Mexican Army General feel somewhat subordinated,”16 if not isolated, from 
the decision-making process in Washington.  
This insight explains the tactical problems that U.S.-Mexico military relations 
face on a day-to-day basis, but it is insufficient to explain the overall absence of military 
cooperation. If structure and organization were the main obstacles to military agreements 
and military-to-military cooperation, then both countries could have resolved this issue 
with relative ease by mutually adjusting their command structure. After all, both 
countries have adjusted their security organizations in the past; most recently, in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and the end of the Cold War. Clearly, a structural and perhaps more 
systemic impediment to military cooperation in U.S.-Mexico relations exist.  
                                                 
16 Heredia, “North America Security Cooperation: Prospects for Growth,” 99. 
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International relations perspectives provide a fourth factor to explain cooperation 
and conflict in U.S.-Mexico relations. For instance, from a realist perspective, power 
asymmetry shapes cooperation among states. The United States is big and powerful 
enough to act unilaterally without consulting its minor partner. On the other hand, 
Mexico is significantly smaller and afraid of bandwagoning with the United States for 
fear of appearing as too dependent on the north. Hence, both countries have few 
incentives to cooperate and prefer not to constrain themselves by binding each other 
through institutions of cooperation.  
Furthermore, relative gains considerations also shape the nature of cooperation. 
As David Baldwin argues: 
When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states 
that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are 
compelled to ask not “Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?” If 
an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ration of two to one, one state 
may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to 
damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for 
both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the 
other will use its increased capabilities.17  
Robert Jervis reinforces this idea by arguing that cooperation in the security realm is 
harder than economic cooperation since “many of the policies designed to increase a 
state’s security automatically and inadvertently decrease the security of others.”18 
Therefore, security regimes, such as military alliances, are very difficult to 
achieve…“because the fear that the other is violating, or will violate, the common 
understanding is a potent incentive for each state to strike out on its own even if it would 
prefer the regime to prosper.”19 Keeping military cooperation informal and without any 
institutional linkages thus serves U.S. and Mexico interests, allowing the former to act 
unilaterally if needed, while preserving the image of the latter as an independent and 
                                                 
17 David A. Baldwin, Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics (New York: Columbia 




autonomous state.20 Consequently, from a realist perspective, Mexico and the United 
States are hesitant to cooperate on military issues due to a set of perverse incentives, 
including hegemony and the unequal distribution of gains emanating from formal 
cooperation. 
Realist insights can account for why countries are unable to cooperate, but they do 
not seem to explain why certain countries are better able to cooperate in some domains 
and in certain times. As mentioned above, the United States and Mexico cooperate in 
trade and financial issues, and they even cooperated in the military domain during World 
War II; yet, cooperation has not been constant or maintained over time. In other words, 
the patterns of cooperation between the two North American nations have varied 
throughout time, suggesting that relative gains and asymmetry are insufficient as a form 
of explanation, since they have been a constant in the bilateral relationship.  
D.  HYPOTHESES 
This studies assesses three different sets of hypotheses regarding U.S.-Mexico 
relations. The first two set of hypotheses are drawn from international relations 
perspectives and provide systemic arguments to explain why countries are unable to 
cooperate. Systemic realism, or neo-realism, argues that the extent to which two states 
cooperate on military issues and form alliances is determined by their mutual level of 
threat. As Stephen Walt argues in his classic book, The Origins of Alliances, “states ally 
to balance against threats rather than against power alone.”21 The author, therefore, 
assesses the extent to which existing mutual threats affect U.S.-Mexico relations. If this 
hypothesis is correct, then military-to-military cooperation should be evident during 
times when both countries have faced common threats. Addressing this question raises 
the opposite; cooperation is inexistent when both countries have faced dissimilar security 
threats. 
                                                 
20 Mario Ojeda, Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México (México: El Colégio de México, 
1984), 93. 
21 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5. 
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The second hypothesis this thesis analyzes is drawn from economic and liberal 
international relations theories in the form of inter-dependence. Reciprocal effects among 
countries or among actors in different countries can characterize inter-dependence. From 
this perspective, inter-dependent links induce large mutual costs and increase 
vulnerability among states involved in interaction; hence, inter-dependence implicitly 
provides strong incentives for cooperation among states in an attempt to reduce those 
mutual costs. According to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, when inter-dependence 
prevails, then states are less likely to use military force to solve their mutual problems.22 
If this hypothesis is correct, then U.S.-Mexico military-to-military cooperation should 
take place when economic inter-dependence has been high between both neighbors, while 
military conflict should prevail when both states have been relatively independent.  
Finally, a third form of explanation drawn from domestic politics and the 
literature on civil-military relations is assessed. It argues that Mexico and the United 
States have followed different civil-military relations patterns, which impede policy 
convergence on defense matters. Military policy is firmly based on civilian supremacy in 
the United States, while the Mexican armed forces exercise autonomy vis-à-vis their 
civilian counterparts. Hence, institutional autonomy allows the military to shape and 
define the country’s defense policy, independent from other actors, including economic 
and social.23 This provides the armed forces with sufficient leeway and bargaining power 
in deciding the scope and domain of military cooperation with its northern neighbor. This 
is exacerbated by the fact that the Mexican military is historically predisposed against the 
United States, with whom it actually fought a war in the late 19th century; thus, making 
military cooperation extremely difficult. 
E.  METHODS AND SOURCES 
To assess the above hypotheses, a number of primary and secondary sources are 
researched. The assessment also relies upon the scholarship that U.S.-Mexico specialists 
                                                 
22 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 
1980), 8. 
23 Roderic Ai Camp, Mexico’s Military on the Democratic Stage (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2005), 39–41. 
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have provided over the past years. Since conducting field research in Mexico was not 
possible, official documents, declarations, and most widely accepted historical accounts 
are traced. Additional sources used throughout this study include academic journals and 
newspapers. 
By focusing on different historical landmark events (such as World War II, the 
Cold War and NAFTA), it is possible to gauge variation in outcomes with multiple 
observations over time, as well as to determine which of the three hypotheses best 
describes and explains the identified puzzle. 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided in three sections. Chapter II, which follows this 
introduction, provides a brief historical review of U.S.-Mexico relations by focusing on 
four distinct periods of cooperation; namely World War II, the Cold War era, NAFTA, 
and post-9/11. This chapter also analyzes how different international relations theories do 
or do not explain U.S.-Mexico military cooperation. Military-to-military cooperation 
means service-to-service interaction, professional contact through military institutions, 
joint military exercises, regular and systematic ministerial meetings, disaster response, 
technological cooperation, peacekeeping, joint equipment purchases, military assistance, 
information sharing, invitation and attendance to military events, visits by chiefs of staff, 
attaché exchanges, and common membership to international security institutions. 
Chapter III assesses how dynamics in civil-military relations have shaped and affected 
U.S.-Mexico military cooperation efforts. Finally, the thesis concludes with a discussion 
of how military cooperation can shed light on the current policy debate regarding the 
Merida Initiative and the increasing levels of violence along the U.S.-Mexico border. 
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II.  U.S. AND MEXICO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter assesses U.S.-Mexico relations from an historical perspective by 
focusing on four critical junctures; namely, World War II, the Cold War era, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 9/11. It also argues that military-to-
military cooperation between the United States and Mexico has varied throughout time, 
reaching its historical peak during World War II and then substantially decreasing in the 
aftermath of 1945. The evidence presented in this chapter also raises questions about 
mainstream international relations theories. As shown below, with the exception of 
World War II, military-to-military cooperation has not been associated with increasing 
levels of threats. Likewise, increased economic interdependence in the post-Cold War era 
has not led to higher levels of military cooperation either. In sum, balance of threats, as 
developed by neo-realism, and interdependence, as developed by liberals, are insufficient 
to explain the historical trajectory of bilateral military cooperation in U.S.-Mexico 
relations. This chapter is divided into four sections, one for each historical juncture.  
A.  WORLD WAR II: MEXICO, A RELUCTANT ALLY 
Throughout the 19th century, Mexico lost more than half of its territory through 
the Mexican-American War of 1846–48. “The U.S. territories of Texas, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Nevada, Utah, California, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming were all once 
part of Mexico.”24 The early 20th century did not modify the status of their relationship; 
characterized by mutual resentment, since then President Woodrow Wilson authorized a 
military intervention in the port of Veracruz in 1914.25 The legacies of past wars exercise 
an influence in today’s bilateral relations, as evidenced in Mexico’s nationalistic rhetoric 
and in its excessive defense of non-intervention.26  
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In the 1930s, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico was threatened by 
land and labor struggles that dominated the Mexican setting. President Cardenas’ 
economic and social reforms put foreign investors on the defensive after the 1936 
Expropriation Law that provided the legal framework for the seizure of property. The 
take over of the railways in 1937 and the expropriation of the oil industry in 1938 
provided the basis for increased friction between both countries.27 By then, the United 
States had abandoned the principle “that the person and property of a U.S. citizen were a 
part of the general domain of the nation, even when abroad,” and had committed to the 
Good Neighbor Policy. The timing of these changes in the policy with Mexico, as well as 
in the United States, was crucial, for without it, relations between the two would have 
deteriorated even more.28  
However, by the 1940s, international events, that is, systemic events, proved 
crucial in improving bilateral relations. After the German invasion of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia in 1938, the United States feared an escalation of the conflict and began 
to shape its hemispheric defense strategy, working out its differences with Mexico. 
During this time, the U.S. and British companies affected by Cardenas’ oil expropriation 
declared an embargo against Mexico. This, in turn, led Mexico to initiate barter deals 
with Germany and Italy—and later Japan. Hence, the United States feared an alliance 
between Mexico and the Axis countries. Germany’s interest in Mexico had been evident 
in World War I, and U.S. intelligence sources revealed that German spy rings were in 
operation in Mexico. These, coupled with Mexico’s sales of strategic materials to Japan, 
concerned the United States. However, the United States considered that an aggressive 
measure against Mexico would have been counterproductive; thus, preferring a tolerant 
attitude toward President Cardenas.29 
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External threats forced the United States to cooperate with Mexico, but domestic 
issues became the driving factor for Mexican cooperation with its northern neighbor. The 
presidential succession of 1940 worried President Cardenas, since the country was still 
institutionally fragile as it was recovering from decades of revolutionary turmoil. 
Cardenas chose a moderate candidate as his successor, Manuel Avila Camacho, but there 
was growing support for the opposition presidential candidate, Juan Andreu Almazan,30 
who supported the idea of allowing foreign oil companies to return to the country, which 
was greatly appealing to U.S. oil companies. President Cardenas feared the United States 
would support Almazan, and ultimately, reached Washington in attempt to win the 
support of President Roosevelt. The U.S. administration, in turn, was willing to support 
Cardenas provided Mexico was committed to the U.S. strategy of hemispheric defense.31 
Hence, bilateral cooperation emerged in the midst of selfish interests, in which the U.S. 
prioritized its strategic concerns, while Mexico focused on its domestic stability. In this 
sense, realist explanations about military alliances make sense; both countries became 
allies in the face of common threats, selfish interests, and strategic bargaining. 
After the Mexican presidential election in 1940, the United States was quick to sit 
at the table and discuss the nature of the bilateral agenda. Amongst the issues discussed 
were a trade agreement, a railroad dispute, the division of water in the Colorado River, 
and economic aid to Mexico for several government agencies.32 Interest in cooperation 
on the part of the United States was such that Vice President Henry A. Wallace attended 
Avila Camacho’s presidential inauguration. Upon his return, he reported that “…for the 
first time since 1910 the U.S. had a good opportunity to clean up sources of 
misunderstanding and irritation.”33 
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Although Mexico was quick to support hemispheric defense, “it soon became 
evident that Mexico’s cooperation on military issues would be contingent on 
compromises in other fields, particularly the solution of the oil question.” Mexican 
officials “wanted clear indication that the U.S. was willing to make concessions.”34 
Eventually, the military issues were formally disassociated from those claims. However, 
the resolution of the expropriated oil companies’ properties was delayed. Thus, Mexico 
also delayed any defense cooperation with the United States. Mexico remained 
noncommittal towards military cooperation until the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.35 
The peak of the military alliance between Mexico and the United States occurred 
between 1941 and 1945. Specifically, Mexico entered the war by joining the Allies in 
1941, considered bandwagoning36 with the United States, after the Mexican tanker 
Potrero del Llano was hit by a German U-boat, marking a critical juncture that led to 
increasing levels of military-to-military cooperation between the United States and 
Mexico.37 During this time, Mexico—for the first time—made several military 
concessions to the United States For instance, overflying agreements were reached and 
U.S. aircraft were allowed to land at Mexican airfields on their way to Panama. Several 
radar systems were also established on Mexican territory. Perhaps the most important 
concession by the Mexican government was to allow a limited number of U.S. military 
personnel on Mexican soil (in most cases, U.S. military personnel had to wear civilian 
attire). Despite these concessions, Mexico rejected the establishment of U.S. military 
bases on its territory and the possibility of a joint military command because these 
implied the deployment of U.S. troops to Mexico and the possible subordination of the 
Mexican Army to a U.S. officer.38  
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Likewise, on May 9, 1944, President Avila Camacho announced that a unit of the 
Mexican air force would be sent overseas to fly in the Pacific theatre, attacking Japanese 
forces in the Philippines. As Robert L. Scheina argues, the Mexican entry into World 
War II was “most timely, coming in the bleak summer of 1942 when U-boats ravaged the 
North Atlantic and the Japanese were capturing one colony after another.”39  
Bandwagoning was not only about supporting the United States, since Mexico 
also gained some substantial benefits from such strategy. Mexico was able to modernize 
its forces and weaponry, new training methods were introduced, and one air squadron 
was allowed to participate in the war of the Pacific. Although the United States was the 
dominant partner in the bilateral relationship, Mexico was able to take advantage of the 
fears and needs of his powerful neighbor. “For the first time, Mexico enjoyed a certain 
level of leverage over the U.S.”40 This proves that even small and less powerful states 
can gain from bandwagoning even in the face of power asymmetry and hegemony. 
Similarly, Mexico’s experience in World War II allowed its armed forces to 
professionalize and transit from the old “Revolutionary army” to the new professional 
army. The new army was eager to acquire modern weapons, training, and equipment, and 
was “less hesitant to negotiate with the U.S., while the old army was more interested in 
preserving their personal power base.”41  
At the same time, Lazaro Cardenas and Avila Camacho were cautious politicians, 
since they were careful not to grant too much power to their generals when dealing with 
U.S.-Mexico defense matters. For instance, “the Mexican members of the Mexico-U.S. 
Defense Commission were never given autonomy in the negotiations with their U.S. 
counterparts.”42 This policy was purposely instrumented to prevent the military from 
becoming too powerful in Mexico. 
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World War II facilitated military and even economic cooperation. In the economic 
domain, cooperation was enhanced by signing several key arrangements to lower trade 
barriers and open markets.43 Several other arrangements facilitated U.S. loans to Mexico 
to develop communications.44 Additionally, over 300,000 Mexicans moved to the U.S. 
under the Bracero Agreements to meet the work demands that war had created. These 
agreements were in effect from 1942 through 1964 when the agreement concluded. By 
the end of this period, “4.5 million Mexicans had entered the U.S. under the auspices of 
the Bracero Agreements.”45 
Therefore, a period of cooperation began with the development of a common 
threat—the Axis of Powers of Italy, Germany and Japan. On the verge of World War II, 
the United States shifted foreign policy from the Monroe Doctrine towards a broader 
concept of hemispheric defense. This new policy was developed with the intention of 
promoting military cooperation between the nations of the Western Hemisphere to drive 
back the external invasion.46 For the first time in their troubled history, Mexico becomes 
a U.S. ally on June 2, 1942 after declaring war on the Axis countries. This marks the 
highest period of military-to-military cooperation between the two countries. It is also the 
period that is best explained by realist theories, in the sense that cooperation emerged 
amidst increased external threats. 
B.  U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR ERA 
With the onset of the Cold War, the commitment to hemispheric defense deluded. 
At the same time, the Monroe Doctrine resurfaced along the same lines it was originally 
conceived. “Reaffirming the unilateral principle of the Monroe Doctrine—rejecting the 
need for cooperative defense arrangements with the Latin American countries—the U.S. 
strategic thinking may be said to have come full circle.”47 Furthermore, nuclear weapons 
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changed the terms of strategic thinking since traditional armies no longer played the same 
deterrent role. Hence, the threat in Latin America became more ideological than military. 
A need to counterbalance Communism existed; and thus, political and economic tools 
were used to deter the Soviet menace in Latin America.48  
At the same time, during the Cold War, Mexico turned towards a more autocratic 
economy and had a limited engagement with the U.S. economy. Without being openly 
confrontational with the United States, Mexico collaborated very little with its northern 
neighbor. “Unlike other Latin American countries, during the Cold War, Mexico did not 
construct a panoply of military relations with the U.S. armed forces.”49 Support for U.S. 
military policies in Western Hemisphere multilateral institutions was absent from the 
1950s through the 1980s. In addition, Mexico did not build any institutions for military 
cooperation with the United States to combat guerrillas, crime or Communist threats and 
rejected bilateral assistance from the United States under the Alliance for Progress.50 
This, in turn, questions realist assumptions about alliance formation, since Mexico and 
the United States had common external threats, but they did not develop a strategic 
alliance to deal with those issues. 
According to Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, the U.S.-
Mexico relationship took a different style from the second half of the 1940s through the 
late 1980s. This new approach had two salient characteristics: bargaining and negligence. 
On the one hand, there was bilateral bargaining (rather than sheer U.S. imposition or 
Mexican defiance), and on the other hand, “each of the two governments, deliberately or 
inadvertently, invested little effort in improving the quality of bilateral relations or 
deepening the opportunities for institutionalized collaboration.”51 Security expert David 
Mares summarizes U.S.-Mexico relations during the Cold War as follows: 
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While Mexico’s grand strategy has focused on its northern neighbor, the 
United States has only sporadically viewed Mexico as relevant to its grand 
strategy. During the early 1970s, first the drug trade and then political 
instability in Mexico stirred minor U.S. interest in rethinking the 
relationship with Mexico. That interest increased during the late 1970s, as 
Mexico’s oil and gas industries boomed, international energy markets 
tightened, and the Central American foreign policies of the two countries 
increasingly diverged. Whether in energy markets or in Central America, 
however, Mexico remained a relatively minor irritant to a U.S. 
government more concerned about challenges from the oil producers’ 
cartel (of which Mexico was not a member), the Soviet Union, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the U.S. Congress.52 
Indeed, during the Cold War, Mexico and the United States developed a tacit 
understanding whereby as long as Mexico refrained from supporting the Soviet Union, or 
adapting its Communist practices in its political system, the United States refrained from 
directly intervening in Mexican affairs. According to Mario Ojeda, this understanding 
developed into a tacit rule: “The U.S. recognizes and accepts Mexico’s need to dissent 
from U.S. policy in everything that is fundamental for Mexico, even if it is important but 
not fundamental for the U.S. In exchange, Mexico cooperates in everything is 
fundamental or merely important for the United State, though not for Mexico.”53 
This tacit bilateral understanding did bring some benefits, even in the absence of 
formal cooperation. For instance, the United States was confident that its northern and 
southern borders were stable, and thus, was able to turn its attention to the Cold War 
struggle in Europe and Asia. Likewise, Mexico benefited from the non-interventionist 
policy of the United States. Indeed, instead of simply respecting Mexico’s sovereignty, 
the United States almost completely ignored it.54 Consequently, negligence prevailed in 
U.S. policy towards Mexico.55 
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The one exception to this rule occurred in 1962, during the Cuban Missile crisis, 
when Mexico unconditionally supported the U.S. bilaterally and even multilaterally at the 
Organization of American States (O.A.S.). At that time, Mexico supported a U.S. 
sponsored resolution at the O.A.S. calling for individual and collective measures, 
including the use of force, to achieve the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.56 
However, Mexico was the only Latin American country that did not break diplomatic 
relations with the Caribbean island. 
One of the most controversial issues in U.S.-Mexican relations during the Cold 
War era was Mexico’s refusal to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The United States was the driving force behind trade liberalization in the 
Western Hemisphere and the strongest supporter of GATT. Mexico, on the other hand, 
had developed a highly protectionist trade regime and did not join GATT until 1986. 
During this period, Mexico developed an inward oriented industrial development strategy 
and opted for an import substitution industrialization model based primarily on barriers 
against imports. This economic strategy enabled Mexico to manage its international trade 
to a certain degree. As a result, Mexico avoided becoming dependent on the United 
States.57  
Thus, it appears the bilateral relationship was fine as long as both countries were 
prosperous; however, conflict did emerge among both states. For instance, the 1970s and 
1980s were marked by constant diplomatic tensions amidst various economic crises in 
both the United States and Mexico.58 For decades, Mexico emphasized the disadvantages 
of having a superpower as a neighbor, while failing to recognize the potential advantages 
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Agency (D.E.A.) agent Enrique Camarena added tension to the relationship in 1984. U.S. 
officials blamed the Mexican government for the Camarena incident, increasing 
Washington’s concern about Mexico’s ability to cope with narcotics.59  
What is particularly interesting in this case, however, is the fact that both 
neighbors rejected a strategic alliance in the military domain. Quite evidently, the United 
States and Mexico had common military threats; however, they chose different if not 
diverse paths in dealing with those security concerns. For instance, because of the Cuban 
missile crisis, Mexico bitterly discovered that it too was a direct target of Soviet 
deterrence. Soviet strategists were determined to block all economic and raw material 
assistance to the United States in case of a nuclear war, thus, Mexican border cities and 
major urban metropolis (including Mexico City) were specifically targeted.60 From a 
realist perspective, Mexico should have either developed its very own nuclear capability 
to deter a Soviet attack or negotiated a set of nuclear guarantees from its powerful 
military neighbor. In fact, Canada had followed this path through the nuclear umbrella 
offered by the United States via NATO. Mexico took neither of these two steps, which 
contradicts realist insights.61 
In summary, Mexico was not a U.S. military ally for most practical purposes. As 
stated above, Mexico cooperated little with the United States in military terms. Although 
the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission (JMUSDC) created during World War II 
remained in existence until the early 1990s, its last combined defense plan was issued in 
1955.62 Mexico did not sign the Defense Assistance Treaty of 1951, and, along with 
Cuba, it did not have a Military Advisory and Assistance Group. Mexico preferred to 
purchase its own military equipment and weapons rather than to receive military 
assistance directly from the United States. Heedful of how the United States used military 
                                                 
59 Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies, Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II, 12. 
60 Nadal Egea and Jorge Alejandro, “Trayectorias de misiles balísticos internacionales: implicaciones 
para los vecinos de las superpotencias,” Foro Internacional 30, no. 1 (July–September 1989): 93–114. 
61 See Arturo Sotomayor, “Nuclear Logics in Latin America: Going Beyond the Usual Suspects,” 
presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, February 15–
20, 2010. 
62 Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, The U.S. and Mexico, Between Partnership and Conflict, 39. 
 21
assistance in other Latin American countries, Mexico tried to decrease U.S. influence by 
relying on a multitude of domestic weapons and equipment suppliers. “It pursued an 
overt and deliberate effort to build nationalist armed forces free from foreign 
influences.”63 For instance, even though Mexico received International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) funds from the United States, less than a 1,000 Mexican 
soldiers benefitted from such grants and exchange programs between 1950 and 1980. 
Again, this raises questions about why states cooperate concerning military affairs, even 
as they face common threats. The evidence coming from U.S.-Mexico relations suggests 
that domestic politics may explain the lack of interest in cooperation. 
C.  U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: NAFTA 
AND BEYOND 
1.  Interdependence and Economic Cooperation  
The 1994 NAFTA enabled Mexico and the United States to bridge the historical 
gap in their bilateral relationship. In fact, NAFTA negotiations resulted in an increased 
period of economic cooperation between Canada, the United States and Mexico. Most 
importantly, it changed mutual perceptions from geopolitics to an economic partnership. 
NAFTA also helped to institutionalize trade, environmental and labor affairs; thus, 
providing a tool for resolving divergent bilateral differences. Additionally, it facilitated 
integration not just at the federal level, but also at the state and local levels.64 
Nevertheless, such unprecedented levels of bilateral cooperation were not seen in the 
military realm, where the bilateral relationship was limited to equipment purchases and 
military training triggered by the Zapatista National Liberation Army’s (EZLN) 
insurgency, in the Mexican state of Chiapas in 1994. In other words, the period of higher 
economic interdependence did not prompt higher levels of military cooperation, which, in 
turn, raises questions about interdependent theories, as developed by Joseph Nye and 
Robert O. Keohane. 
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NAFTA was negotiated when the Mexican economy engaged in trade 
liberalization, after the 1980s debt crisis. Indeed, Mexico embarked on a bilateral trade 
strategy with the United States because it wanted to maintain U.S. markets open to 
Mexican exports. This process began by slowly adhering to the international trade regime 
created by GATT. Overall, Mexico and the United States signed six bilateral trade 
agreements between 1985 and 1989. Finally, after 40 years of GATT, Mexico joined the 
regime in 1986, making an important shift in its economic policy. This was an important 
move on Mexico’s strategy because it signaled a commitment towards more economic 
liberalization.65  
NAFTA negotiations began in 1991, at the request of Mexican President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari. Negotiations lasted for almost three years and almost collapsed when 
President Bill Clinton took power in 1992, since he was a traditional supporter of labor 
unions that vehemently opposed the agreement. Finally, NAFTA entered into force on 
January 1, 1994.66 The accord’s aim was to create a partnership between Canada, Mexico 
and the United States. This agreement formed one of the largest trading blocks in the 
world. It promoted the free flow of goods and got rid of tariffs, duties, and trade barriers 
over a period of 15 years between trading partners. Additionally, it gave duty-free status 
to almost 65% of all U.S.-made goods. Tariffs on all vehicles within NAFTA were 
phased out over 10 years with the introduction of rules of origins, which stipulated that 
vehicles must have at least 62.5% of its contents produced locally within the NAFTA 
countries to qualify for tariff reductions.67 
The NAFTA accord opened the door for U.S. investment in Mexico in a variety of 
ways. For instance, under the treaty, U.S. banks could establish bank branches in Mexico 
and U.S. citizens could invest in Mexico’s insurance industry and banks. Although, 
foreign ownership of oil fields was prohibited, U.S. firms could compete for contracts 
with Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and operate like any other Mexican company. A 
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very small written provision was made concerning the movement of selected 
professionals and executives, but the matter of large-scale migration of labor was 
omitted.68 
Two important ideas can be stated about NAFTA and its impact on U.S.-Mexico 
relations. First, as Guy Poitras argues, NAFTA “symbolizes the regionalization that had 
already taken place in North America.”69 Indeed, Mexico finally admitted that its social 
and economic indicators were directly linked to those in the United States. Immigration 
and economic liberalization had made Mexico closer to its northern neighbor, and thus, 
forced integration with the United States. By signing NAFTA, “Mexican leaders decided 
to recognize the realities of the market and to institutionalize an economic partnership 
with the U.S., departing from the nation’s historical tendency to maintain its distance.”70 
NAFTA also reflects convergence over economic policy, and especially, over 
U.S. approaches to trade, investment and other issues. In many ways, it also recognizes 
that the economic model that best serves the interests of all countries is that of the United 
States. It thus increases economic interdependence and creates economic bonds difficult 
to untangle. As stated before, Mexico was looking to attract investment to simulate 
employment, and thus, reduce social tension. Indeed, NAFTA provided Carlos Salinas 
with the opportunity to institutionalize its economic reforms through an international 
treaty, and in this way, protect them from the historical unpredictability of presidential 
successions. NAFTA also linked Mexico with two advanced industrial democracies of 
the first world, allowing Mexican diplomacy to increase its leverage in relation to other 
Latin American countries; therefore, serving as a “bridge” between the developing world 
and the developed world.71  
                                                 
68 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, 251–258. 
69 Guy Poitras, Inventing North America: Canada, Mexico, and the United States (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 99. 
70 Guadalupe Gonzalez, “Foreign Policy Strategies in a Globalized World: The Case of Mexico,” in 
Latin America in the New International System, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001), 163. 
71 Ibid., 257–258. 
 24
Hence, the NAFTA negotiations alone represented an extraordinary period of 
cooperation for these three North American nations. After NAFTA was implemented, 
Mexico replaced Japan as the second largest U.S. trading partner.72 It also provided a set 
of rules and procedures to address common problems and find common solutions to 
avoid conflict. Following neo-liberal insights and liberal accounts, the treaty increased 
information flow and technical capacities to improve bilateral policy decision-making. 
Likewise, institutionalization allowed Mexico to discuss sensitive bilateral issues, such as 
migration and drug trafficking, by separating these contentious issues from trade and 
finances.73 Interdependence increased cooperation and “improved coordination between 
trade officials on both sides of the border; it also increased the burden on those officials 
who must deal with intensified trade and economic transactions at the border itself.”74  
2.  Interdependence and Security Without Much Military Cooperation 
Despite increased levels of economic interdependence and cooperation, Mexico 
and the United States resisted calls for closer military cooperation. In fact, high-level 
official security consultation improved in the area of public and border security, but 
military-to-military cooperation was limited to equipment purchases and military 
training, especially for anti-narcotic and anti-insurgency campaigns.75  
The United States, with the implementation of Operation Intercept in 1969, 
coerced Mexico into the drug war. This operation virtually closed the border for 20 days 
and caused great economic damages to Mexico, which forced the government to 
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that attempted to eradicate marijuana and poppy fields. Ultimately, this policy triggered 
the cartelization of drug trafficking and worsened the bilateral relationship by the mid 
1980s.76 
It was during this time that Mexico began to accept unprecedented quantities of 
helicopters, specialized aircraft, spare parts, pilot training and other forms of technical 
assistance. It also sought to formalize the presence of U.S. law enforcement agents that 
for decades, with or without notification, had gathered intelligence in Mexico. In 1983, 
under pressure from the United States, Mexico increased its military participation in the 
war against drug trafficking.77 This, however, does not translate into military-to-military 
cooperation, but is the result of unilateral action on behalf of U.S. states to tackle what is 
essentially a public security challenge, in the form of drug-trafficking. In other words, 
this is not consistent with the definition of military-to-military cooperation defined in the 
introduction, which includes mutual measures, such as service-to-service interaction, 
professional contact through military institutions, joint exercises, and regular ministerial 
meetings, among others.  
In 1985, U.S. pressures against Mexico increased because of the Enrique 
Camarena incident, the D.E.A. agent murdered on Mexican soil while performing his 
anti-narcotic duties. Many U.S. officials accused the Mexican government —focus was 
placed on the police—for being directly involved in Camarena’s murder. Hence, the U.S. 
launched Operation Intercept II, which virtually closed down the southern border for 
eight days, forcing Mexico to accept unilateral incursions by U.S. security forces.  
In 1986, the United States increased its intelligence operations in Mexico and 
began using more sophisticated military equipment. This led to the capture of two 
Mexican citizens accused of complicity in the Camarena affair; but such a move occurred 
on Mexican soil, without the consent or authorization of Mexico’s government. 
Eventually, this unilateral action alarmed and outraged Mexican authorities since U.S. 
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policy appeared to be “based on the willful disregard of the sovereignty of other states.”78 
Alarmed by U.S. unilateral actions, Mexico formulated new policies designed to counter 
its two security threats: drug trafficking and American unilateralism. In 1988, President 
de la Madrid declared drug trafficking a security threat to national security and staged a 
permanent campaign against it. Additionally, Mexico proposed a set of new agreements 
with the United States to facilitate extradition, such as the 1994 U.S.-Mexican Extradition 
Treaty.79 
Another issue that increased U.S. concerns about Mexico’s security was the 
Zapatista insurgent movement in Chiapas in 1994. The Mexican government launched an 
offensive against the Zapatista guerrillas who had quickly seized seven towns. The fight 
ended with a cease-fire agreement on January 12.80 During this time, the army and police 
were heavily criticized as they faced allegations of human right abuses during their 
operations.81 In response to the Zapatista insurgency, Mexico increased its defense 
budget significantly; while it developed a closer security relationship with the United 
States. Mexico increased its defense procurement, maintenance, operations and 
construction.82  
In 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry visited Mexico to discuss a wide array 
of bilateral security issues and to foster cooperation in the war against drug trafficking. 
This was the first time that a U.S. defense secretary officially visited Mexico.83 Virtually 
no operational military-to-military cooperation had existed prior to this visit. These 
interactions set the stage for increased U.S. military training of Mexican officials and for 
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the transfer of military equipment to assist Mexico in the fight against drug trafficking.84 
Nevertheless, cooperation was limited to drug trafficking, and, as John A. Cope argues, a 
distant, circumscribed and limited military relationship still existed between the armed 
forces of the United States and Mexico.85  
During the 1990s, Mexico ordered 263 Belgian and 28 U.S. armored personnel 
carriers, four UH-60 helicopters, and accepted a donation of 73 UH-1H helicopters. The 
irony of it all is that in 1998, a year after the purchases, the Mexican National Defense 
Ministry grounded the U.S. donated helicopters and returned them to Washington arguing 
that repair options were too costly. In fact, the helicopters were over 30-years old.86 
Likewise, IMET increased from half-million in 1995 to $9 million in 1998. The number 
of Mexican officers instructed in U.S. military schools reached an unprecedented total of 
757 officers. The same year, the U.S. government provided about $35 million in military 
assistance to Mexico. “The U.S. justified this increased budget as part of the counter-
narcotics effort; Mexico understood it, of course, as assistance to its national security.”87  
Consequently, during this period, military-to-military cooperation increased, but it 
was mostly restrained to drug trafficking, with few institutional linkages similar to those 
developed in the economic realm, with NAFTA. In fact, the interaction between U.S. and 
Mexican defense authorities occurred during private meetings and through informal 
mechanisms, encompassing exclusively the respective armies’ chiefs and port calls by 
U.S. Navy ships to Mexican ports. Institutionalization of military relations remained 
weak at best, non-existent at worst. In sum, even as the economies of both countries 
increased their interaction and became heavily interdependent, military-to-military 
cooperation was limited. Furthermore, relations between the armed forces of the United  
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States and Mexico were distant, even as both countries faced the growing common threat 
of organized crime. Hence, liberal and realist accounts fail to account for the lack of 
substantial military cooperation in U.S.-Mexico relations.  
D.  U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
On September 11, 2001, the United States was the target of terrorist attacks. Two 
hijacked aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center Towers in New York and one in 
the Pentagon in Washington. Another hijacked aircraft went down over the fields in 
Pennsylvania. Altogether, 3,000 people were killed.88 This terrible incident changed 
international relations and modified U.S.–Mexico relations. From that moment on, 
national security became the U.S. number one priority, displacing other items in the 
bilateral agenda.89 In response to the attacks, the United States waged a “war on terror” 
and refocused its international priorities to tackle international terrorism. As a side effect 
of the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy, Washington began to pay more attention to the 
security of its borders. Ironically, the war on terror increased Mexico’s strategic 
importance. Although, Mexico discreetly aligned its policies to cater to U.S. security 
priorities, many moments of public friction existed in the bilateral relationship because 
security priorities had taken attention away from economic and social issues, which were 
deemed as highly important to Mexico.90  
Immediately after the attacks, the Mexican government privately supported the 
United States. For example, condolences were sent from President Fox’s office via fax, 
and two days later, he called President Bush to express his support. On the other hand, 
public reaction of the Mexican government was confusing. Mexico’s Foreign Affairs 
Secretary, Jorge Castañeda, expressed full support during a press address to the U.S. 
media. Yet, this action was heavily criticized by Mexico’s public opinion. Thus, in a later 
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address to the media, Castañeda made somewhat contradictory statements, saying that the 
United States did not need and did not asked for Mexico’s military help.91 Finally, on 
September 18, Mexico released a public statement condemning the terrorist attacks and 
reiterating Mexico’s support to the U.S. government and its people. Additionally, in very 
broad terms, Mexico expressed its position to cooperate in the international community—
but not specifically with the United States—to prevent and eradicate terrorism. A few 
days later, President Fox expressed his support to the United States without committing 
Mexico’s military arguing that the country did not have an army ready to fight externally. 
Weeks later, he visited Washington, D.C. where he reaffirmed Mexico’s commitment to 
the war on terror.92 
Overall, cooperation was private and very informal. Days after the attacks, 
Mexico assisted the United States with the review of travel itineraries of possible 
terrorists and suspicious financial transactions. Furthermore, on the eve of the U.S. war in 
Iraq, in 2003, the Mexican government deployed 10,000 troops to its southern and 
northern borders to protect the area against possible terrorists infiltration onto U.S. soil.93 
In March 2003, the United States went to war in Iraq without an authorization 
from the United Nations’ Security Council. This event triggered a serious crisis in U.S.-
Mexico relations and military-to-military cooperation deteriorated. Key military allies, 
including the United Kingdom, Spain, and Japan, supported the U.S. war effort; however, 
Mexico refused to go along. In fact, Mexico was one of the 15 members of the U.N. 
Security Council at the time, but the country remained adamantly opposed to the war in 
Iraq. As Monica Serrano and Paul Kenny argue, “when deputies from President Fox’s 
PAN (Party of National Action) referred to a “despot”, they meant George W. Bush; 
when a leading opposition deputy talked of ‘war, horror, death, genocide and holocaust,’ 
he was referring not to Saddam’s Iraq but to policies that should not be supported by 
                                                 





Mexico.”94 Hence, “Mexico balanced against the decision to go to war in Iraq and would 
in the years following remain strongly opposed to U.S. Iraq war policy.”95 In response, 
President Bush both threatened Mexico with discipline and increased pressure on 
Mexico. 
According to Jorge Dominguez y Rafael Fernandez, three factors contributed to 
the Fox administration’s reactionary attitude towards U.S. security policies. One was that 
Fox believed that the war in Iraq was a “war of choice.” Second, Fox believed no 
persuasive evidence existed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Third, Fox 
believe that “’the U.S. did not really have much carrot, and no stick at all’”96 because he 
was sure the United States would not back out of NAFTA, nor would it pull DEA support 
from Mexico. Additionally, Mexico had paid back all its loans to the International 
Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury. In other words, the Fox administration thought 
Mexico did not depend on U.S. assistance and that the United States could do little to 
punish Mexico. Unfortunately, for Mexico, Fox underestimated the cost to U.S.-Mexico 
relations.  
Ultimately, the Bush administration dropped its pressures, but the damaged had 
been done and mutual trust between Fox and Bush did not return naturally. Mexico and 
the United States remained as distant military allies, cooperating exclusively on issues 
regarding drug trafficking and violence in borders. However, the U.S. response to the 
attacks of September 11 impacted Mexico’s counter-narcotics efforts. Initially, the United 
States had to divert assets assigned to counter-narcotics operations. It pulled three-
quarters of the U.S. Coast Guard assets from the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico, and 
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missions without the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. intelligence. In a similar way, 60 FBI 
agents were pulled from the Mexican border to other missions. To complicate things, 
cops corrupted by the cartels betrayed the Mexican government.97  
On a positive note, two political accomplishments would ease tension in the 
bilateral relationship. In 2002, President Bush signed the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act. This suspended the U.S. drug certification and sanctions procedures that had soured 
U.S.-Mexico relations in the past. For its part, Mexico created a new National Security 
Council and its own National Security Law in 2004. These actions provide Mexico with 
the means to organize anti-crime efforts and gather intelligence.98 
Still, by 2005 and 2006, border violence escalated, particularly on the Mexican 
side. President Felipe Calderon launched a major campaign against drug trafficking and 
other violent organizations. To accomplish this, he deployed 27,000 troops within 11 
Mexican states, which in turn, assumed law enforcement functions by effectively 
replacing local, but unreliable, police forces. Within a month in the presidency, 284 
federal police and agents were dismissed along with thousands of Mexican officials on 
the grounds of drug traffic-related corruption.99  
In the face of increased violence, the U.S. government responded to Mexico’s 
efforts eagerly. Cooperation with the Mexican Navy increased and “U.S. agencies trained 
thousands of Mexican law enforcement agents in 2007.”100 Yet, cooperation remained 
limited to security and anti-narcotics. In 2007, President Calderon and President Bush 
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for increased U.S. military training and exchange of intelligence. However, Mexico also 
insisted that no U.S. troops would enter Mexican territory, nor would U.S. civilian agents 
participate in operations inside the country.101 
Plan Merida had a multilayered approach to assist Mexico and Central American 
countries in their combat strategies against drug. Plan Merida itself includes the transfer 
of $1.4 billion dollars to Mexico over a period of three years. While this appears to 
increase military-to-military cooperation, most of these funds are to be used to purchase 
equipment and technology infrastructure for the exclusive use of Mexico’s military and 
law enforcement agencies. Few resources are to be used for institution building, law 
enforcement initiatives, courts, and prisons.102 The Merida initiative does not include 
joint exercises or military ventures of the type the U.S. conducts with other military 
allies, such as Canada, the U.K. and other NATO partners. In fact, when U.S. defense 
Secretary Robert Gates visited Mexico in 2008, he referred to U.S.-Mexico military to 
military relations as “not in its infancy, but is young… He acknowledged the sensitivities 
here in Mexico as his explanation for why the relationship is limited.”103  
In sum, Mexico’s current military strategy remains similar to that pursued by 
Presidents Salinas, Zedillo and Fox. The relationship has become more intense and 
intimate, but this does not translate into a strategic alliance. Both countries are friends 
and economic allies, but distant neighbors when it comes to military affairs. Military 
cooperation is still limited and constrained, even in the face of increasing mutual threats, 
such as terrorism and turf wars among drug cartels. 
                                                 
101 Merida Initiative Official Web site, Secretaria de Gobernación, Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores, http://www.iniciativamerida.gob.mx/?page=que-es-iniciativa-merida (accessed February 2010). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 169. 
 33
III.  CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
UNITED STATES (U.S.)-MEXICO MILITARY RELATIONS 
The present study began by identifying a counterintuitive puzzle; that is, the 
United States and Mexico are strategic economic partners, but reluctant military allies. 
Why are these two interdependent countries so resistant to military cooperation? The 
previous chapter analyzed the bilateral relationship from an historical perspective using 
two of the most predominant international relations approaches, neo-realism and 
interdependence. Despite their explanatory power and value, both theories fail to explain 
the empirical puzzle identified in this study accurately. This, in turn, suggests that the 
absence of military-to-military cooperation in U.S.-Mexico relations lies not in 
international variables, but in domestic politics. Consequently, this chapter analyzes a key 
variable in Mexico’s domestic politics that affects incentives for military cooperation. In 
particular, it argues that civil-military relations in Mexico impede higher levels of 
military-to-military cooperation with the United States. Indeed, military segregation and 
autonomy dissuade the Mexican armed forces from engaging their northern neighbor in 
ways that resemble U.S.-Mexico trade and economic cooperation.  
To develop this argument, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one 
deals with the issue of military segregation, including its historical sources and the 
perverse consequences. The second part of this chapter discusses how autonomy plays a 
role in shaping Mexico’s defense preferences. Finally, the third section analyzes the 
armed forces’ mission and orientation.  
A.  SEGREGATED DEFENSE POLICY  
One of the key characteristics of Mexico’s civil-military relations is that its 
military establishment is, effectively, segregated and isolated from politics, including 
foreign policy. In other words, unlike countries, such as the United States, where defense 




argued in this section, segregation had positive consequences on the stability of civil-
military relations in Mexico, but it also imposed a set of limits to cooperating militarily 
with the United States.  
In a recent article published by Arturo Sotomayor, he argues that segregated 
national security doctrines tend to develop isolationist policies in world affairs, especially 
in the military domain. Following David Mares, Sotomayor argues that segregation is a 
civil-military pattern distinguished by its separation of tasks, whereby the military 
monopolizes every issue related to national security, while politicians are charged with 
developing the national wealth and conducting diplomacy. This civil-military pattern 
tends to isolate the military form politics, including international and foreign affairs.104  
Indeed, the Mexican armed forces have been historically segregated from foreign 
policy. The root of this segregation stem from a “pact’ signed between the civilian 
leadership and the generals in the late 1920s. The Mexican armed forces are the direct 
inheritors of the Revolutionary Army that defeated the Porfirio Diaz dictatorial regime in 
1910. A number of caudillos, which in turn, occupied key positions within the 
Revolutionary Army, thus led the new regime that emerged from the dust of the 
revolutionary war. Hence, the key, if not the only predominant actors during the early 
years of Mexico’s Revolutionary era, were the Army generals (now former caudillos). To 
some extent, the Dictatorship of Diaz was substituted by a Revolutionary movement led 
essentially by military insurgents. The military dominated Mexico’s early political life, 
with many important revolutionary generals holding influential political posts between 
1928–1934.  
The foundation of the National Revolutionary Party (later the Revolutionary 
Institutional Party-PRI) in 1938 by then President and General Plutarco Elias Calles 
brought important changes to Mexican military politics. The party itself was created to 
halt violence and turf wars between the various victorious factions of the Mexican 
Revolution. In an effort to instill loyalty for the new party, Calles implemented a number 
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of policies, including the professionalization of the Revolutionary Army by promoting 
young officers. However, it was not until the arrival to the presidency of General Lazaro 
Cardenas that the military began to be segregated from domestic politics. 
Cardenas was interested in institutionalizing revolutionary politics in Mexico by 
strengthening the National Revolutionary Party. To that end, he not only changed the 
name of the party itself, but also incorporated more social sectors into its rank and file. 
Labor unions, peasants, and entrepreneurs were introduced into the party system once 
dominated by revolutionary generals. This, in turn, shifted power by allowing civilians to 
be included into the party’s decision-making process.  
Similarly, Cardenas promoted a pact that eventually separated the party from the 
military establishment. The pact was a simple tacit agreement between soldiers and 
civilians whereby the former accepted the demilitarization of politics and the latter 
conceded institutional autonomy. The pact was based on two unwritten rules: the priísta 
government would respect military autonomy, and in return, the military would support 
the civilian regime.105 The pact was also based on the principle of non-political 
intervention, which meant unconditional military support for the PRI and its leader, the 
president in office.  
This pact facilitated the division of labor and made possible the emergence of a 
consensus, placing special emphasis on civilian supremacy, since there was nothing 
above the party. By 1946, when the first civilian president was elected (President Miguel 
Aleman Valdez), the military institution had not only been unified and disciplined, but 
had also been successfully subordinated to the civilian power. To ensure that the armed 
forces would remain loyal to the hegemonic party, PRI rulers limited budgets, 
reorganized military zones, and imposed education programs explicitly focusing on 
developing loyalty and discipline towards the party and civilian leadership. In other 
words, military-party links regulated, managed and co-opted the military’s political 
behavior. In exchange, the armed forces were given institutional autonomy to decide 
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promotions, doctrine, strategy, and, of course, military operations.106 In accordance with 
Samuel Huntington’s reasoning, civilian control was established in Mexico through both 
objective and subjective means; that is, via professionalization, socializing soldiers to 
adopt an officer corps ethos, and via force division, by making the force subordinate to 
the political imperatives of the party in rule.107  
The pact not only allowed a peaceful transition of power from the military to a 
civilian authority, it also enabled Mexico to maintain political stability precisely when the 
international system imposed serious pressures. Miguel Aleman was not only the first 
civilian president in Mexico; he also took power in the midst of World War II, just when 
U.S.-Mexico relations were improving after years of bilateral conflict. 
Nevertheless, the unintended consequence of such pact was the de facto 
segregation of the military from politics, in general, and from foreign policy, in 
particular. Members of the military were not allowed to participate in politics, unless they 
had effectively retired from the force. A similar trend occurred in foreign policy. Unlike 
the United States, Mexico did not have a National Security Council to deal with security 
issues, precisely because it wanted to keep the armed forces isolated from the decision-
making process. Indeed, with the exception of World War II, the Mexican armed forces 
were segregated, restrained and constrained to internal security and defense. Furthermore, 
civilians were hesitant to concede authority to generals during World War II. As argued 
in the previous chapter, “the Mexican members of the Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission 
were never given autonomy in the negotiations with their U.S. counterparts.”108  
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The Cancillería, or Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was then delegated with the task 
of conducting Mexico’s foreign relations. To this end, Mexico developed a mostly 
defensive and very legalistic foreign policy mostly concerned with economic 
development, political stability, and non-intervention in domestic affairs. This, in turn, 
explains why the “Mexican government did not have an interest or capacity to participate 
actively in international politics during the early Cold War years.”109 It also explains why 
Mexico was not eager to continue cooperating with the United States in military affairs, 
since such a move would have violated the principle of the pact itself, which was based 
on military segregation.  
The evidence seems to suggest that Mexico prioritized political stability of the 
regime over other issues, including strong military ties with the United States. Every 
policy, including foreign policy, was designed to keep the PRI regime in power and 
enable the party itself to rule with peace. Consequently, the absence of military-to-
military cooperation in the post-Cold War era was not due to lack of interest, balance of 
threats or interdependence. Instead, strong political forces within Mexico impeded a 
sustained and more profound cooperation with Washington in military affairs. 
How then it is possible to explain the lack of military-to-military cooperation in 
the 1990s and 2000, when Mexico finally transited towards democracy? The 
democratization of Mexican politics in 2000 did not modify the civil-military pact itself; 
it simply altered party politics, but not civil-military relations. The Air Force, and 
especially the Army, continued to be focused on their domestic missions, consisting 
essentially of maintaining control of the intelligence community, providing public 
services in rural communities, containing revolutionary movements (such as the Zapatista 
movement in Chiapas and elsewhere), and halting trans-national organized crime (mostly 
drug-trafficking).110  
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Furthermore, the military institution did not represent the main obstacle for 
political liberalization. Consequently, there have been fewer incentives for military 
reform and modernization, since the armed forces are not perceived as an obstruction for 
competitive party politics. Thus, the nature of the civil-military pact remains intact, even 
if the dominant party has collapsed.  
In addition, the Mexican armed forces have operated isolated from other federal 
agencies for many years. Wide-spread mistrust seem to exist between the Army and the 
Navy with respect to the federal, state and local law enforcement entities in Mexico, 
based in part on a lack of knowledge and interaction, but more so in the perception that 
the police forces in Mexico are notoriously corrupt. It was precisely the perception of law 
enforcement ineffectiveness and corruption that made President Felipe Calderon turn to 
the armed forces to fight the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) since he took office 
in 2006. This fear of other federal agencies tends to reinforce military segregation.111 
In sum, the military continues to be segregated from the decision-making process, 
assuming perhaps increasing roles and responsibilities due to drug trafficking and 
organized crime. Military-to-military cooperation remains limited in U.S.-Mexico 
relations, since the Mexican armed forces are still isolated from foreign policy and 
international affairs dynamics. In other words, the military establishment continues to 
have an inward-looking approach to anything related to defense matters, even if Mexico 
has now become more important to the United States than ever. 
B.  AUTONOMY AND DOCTRINE 
In addition to military segregation, the Mexican armed forces enjoy institutional 
autonomy on issues regarding operations, procedures, education, procurement, and 
organization. Hence, not only is the military segregated from foreign policy, but it also is 
actually independent from civilian imperatives, which also affects incentives for  
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cooperation with the United States. To understand how the armed forces operate, it is 
essential to explain the sources autonomy, which includes defense organization, budgets 
and procurement.  
First, the Mexican military enjoys military autonomy in defense organization. As 
David Pion-Berlin argues,  
military political autonomy… refers to the military's aversion towards or 
even defiance of civilian control. While it is part of the state, the military 
often acts as if it were above and beyond the constitutional authority of the 
government. The degree of political autonomy is a measure of the 
military's determination to strip civilians of their political prerogatives and 
claim these for itself. As the armed forces accumulate powers, they 
become increasingly protective of their gains. The more valuable and 
entrenched their interests are, the more vigorously they will resist the 
transfer of control over these to democratic leader.112  
The term political autonomy matches Mexico’s reality, since the defense 
establishment is supervised by the military itself, as the Ministry of Defense is a ranking 
member of the Army. Furthermore, different ministerial offices lead the Army and the 
Navy , have separate budgets and tend to report exclusively to the President. 
Likewise, military promotions, retirements, and appointments are the exclusive 
domain of the armed forces themselves, with little or no civilian intervention.113 In other 
words, military policy and personnel decisions depend exclusively on the discretion of 
the armed forces.  
Similarly, Congress does not exercise legislative oversight over the armed forces. 
As Jordi Diez argues, “although the questioning of ministers by the defense and navy 
committees makes them accountable to the legislature, it has not been consequential; both 
ministers have systematically denied any wrongdoing and no investigation have been 
launched into the allegations by the ministries of Defense and the Navy.”114 In fact, 
                                                 
112 David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” 
Comparative Politics 25 (October 1992): 84.  
113 Ibid., 87. 
114 Jordi Diez, “Legislative Oversight of the Armed Forces in Mexico,” Mexican Studies 24, no. 1 
(Winter 2008): 128. 
 40
Congress has no competence when it comes to allegations of human rights committed by 
the military, since the Military Code of Justice provides implicit protection to soldiers 
and shields them from civilian intervention. A serious impediment to congressional 
oversight is the fact that most members of Congress who chair the defense and navy 
committees tend to be retired military officers themselves; thus, promotions, retirements 
and appointments tend to pass without any legislative questioning. 
In recent years, multiple efforts have been attempted to make the military 
processes more transparent. In 2002 and 2003, reforms were introduced to modify the old 
promotion laws; yet, these changes have done very little to lower military autonomy. The 
lack of civilian expertise in military affairs is a serious obstacle to the promotion process, 
which in turn, enables the armed forces to behave as if there was no civilian oversight.  
Second, the Mexican military enjoys political autonomy in budgetary affairs. 
While Congress is supposed to exercise budgetary oversight, in practice, legislators often 
approve military budgets as presented by the President. Historically, Congress has never 
altered or modified the amounts allocated to the Army and Navy, even though it has 
modified other items in the national budget. This practice heralds back to the PRI era, 
when the executive branch was responsible for delivering the budget, while Congress 
passively accepted his proposal.115  
A deep-rooted culture of secrecy prevails in Mexico in terms of defense spending. 
To date, it might be possible to know how much is allocated to national defense, but quite 
little is know about how it is actually spent. As Jordi Diez argues, “autonomy over 
spending was one of the most important aspects that characterized the civil-military pact 
during the PRI rule, and the armed forces used it assertively.”116 Once Congress 
approved budgets, the military had complete discretion to spend it. “The level of 
discretion has continued, and Congress has neither influenced decisions on spending nor 
overseen the actual spending.”117  
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Third, procurement is another issue area in which the military enjoys significant 
autonomy. During the PRI era, the acquisition of military equipment was a very secretive 
and silent process. Access to equipment acquisition information was kept protected from 
outsiders. The only civilian informed of such purchases was the President himself, in his 
position as commander in chief. Congress and the general public had virtually no access 
to information regarding military acquisitions. A 2002 federal law on transparency and 
access to information, and a 2007 constitutional reform, increased avenues for public 
scrutiny of the Mexican government.118 However, progress made in promoting 
transparency within the military has not yet been entirely matched by the services. The 
Army has often argued that acquisitions information is a national security issue, and thus, 
protected from disclosure.119  
As mentioned before, Congress has rarely questioned the Navy and Army 
secretaries about reported cases of irregularities. For instance, in 2002, the Defense 
Secretary awarded six contracts to the firm Constructora y Edificadora Comalcalco, 
which was owned by the son of a retired division general. While this was in clear 
violation of legal stipulations, no investigations or inquiry was ever launched.120 
The absence of civilian control in Mexico is an impediment to military-to-military 
cooperation with the United States. As Craig Deare argues: 
The absence of an effective and trained civilian cadre in the defense realm 
not only has internal consequences for Mexico, but also contributes to 
interoperability issues with its counterparts to the north. The military-to-
military relationships, primarily service-to-service, are adequate as far as 
they go. But in the U.S. Department of Defense, the Secretary, Under 
Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other officials are all civilians  
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appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They have no 
civilian counterparts in Mexico; the same is true for the cadre of civil 
servants who work in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.121 
Ultimately, political autonomy impedes civilian control and incites military 
segregation, impeding convergence between civilian imperatives and military interests. In 
Mexico, the military acts as if it were above and beyond the authority of civilian 
governments. As the armed forces have accumulated prerogatives and powers, they have 
become increasingly protective, skeptical of civilian and foreign intervention, unwilling 
to cooperate with external actors for fear of losing their protected gains. As a result, the 
armed forces have vested interests in keeping outsiders out of the military domain, be it 
civilians or foreigners. 
C.  MISSION AND ORIENTATION 
Mission and orientation is another factor that shapes incentives for military 
cooperation. Formal military cooperation and strategic alliances are more likely to 
emerge among countries that share similar doctrines, since this factor often facilitates 
inter-operability and jointness. While the United States and Mexico share similar 
economic structures, their military doctrines are inherently dissimilar.  
U.S. doctrine is shaped fundamentally by external threats and has organized and 
equipped its military to deal essentially with external enemies. By contrast, the Mexican 
armed forces have been an inward-looking institution, driven essentially by internal 
threats and roles.122 Indeed, with the exception of World War II, the Mexican armed 
forces have had an internally oriented role to perform. Mexico does not view any country 
as a potential threat or rival. “In fact, the Mexican armed forces do not have the structure, 
organization, or the capacity, to fulfill a traditional external defense mission (i.e., national 
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defense, preservation the sovereignty and territorial integrity).”123 “That threat, in fact, is 
not even a scenario considered in the national strategy, in light of the relative position and 
asymmetries of Mexico with its neighbors: the enormous power of United States and the 
small Central American countries.”124 As Sotomayor argues, “Mexico is too small to 
fight a war against the United States and too big to battle the small and weak states to its 
south.”125 
In the absence of significant external threats, the armed forces’ focus is on its 
internal threats. Traditionally, Latin America’s armed forces have had a variety of 
internal security functions: counterinsurgency, drug interdiction, fighting organized 
crime, and quelling social protest. Guerrilla insurgency remains a problem in areas, such 
as Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas. For instance, subversion and counterinsurgency was 
particularly intense during the 1994 Zapatista revolt in Chiapas. Drug interdiction has 
become the most visible role performed by the military in Mexico; one which the United 
States has urged Mexico (along with other Latin American states) to assume. However, 
as Wendy Hunter reiterates, fighting the drug war is imperative, but assigning such a 
mission to the armed forces promises to be counterproductive from the standpoint of 
scaling back the military’s influence in Latin American society. A military charged with 
drug interdiction could very well demand the right to conduct surveillance, to apprehend 
suspects, and even to administer justice.”126  
Civic action and development roles, such as the provision of food and health 
services in poor and remote areas, infrastructure building, and environmental protection, 
is another internal role performed by the Mexican military. Civic action stems from 
Mexico’s need to reach rural areas, especially during natural disasters.127 
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Ultimately, these differences in mission and orientation also affect the chances of 
inter-operability and jointness with the United States. As Deare argues: 
the American and Mexican militaries have evolved in distinct fashions 
over the past 100 years, and today have very different responsibilities, 
mission sets, orientations, and capabilities. In addition, a number of 
structural realities present on each side of the border, including a bilateral 
lack of trust, pose challenges for improved interaction and greater 
collaboration between the armed forces of each country. The combination 
of circumstances has created an “incompatible interface” in terms of U.S.-
Mexican military interaction.128 
In sum, the liberalization of politics in Mexico has made the armed forces even 
more inward looking and nationalist. The absence of democratic civilian control and 
accountability means that civilian leaders are not responsible for designing and shaping 
military policy in Mexico, and thus, provide little or no input on issues regarding military 
cooperation with the United States. As Sotomayor argues, “while Mexico is the U.S. third 
largest trading partner, its inability to provide military support to Washington makes it a 
less than reliable neighbor and ally, particularly at a time when the U.S. administration 
has prioritized strategic and military security concerns.”129 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Since the 1990s, a quantitative and qualitative shift in economic relations has 
occurred between Canada, Mexico and the United States through the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA has indeed deepened economic and social 
integration between neighbors. Nevertheless, despite this economic partnership, Mexico 
and the United States are far from being military allies. Since NAFTA was signed in 
1994, the United States and Mexico have rarely developed institutional links in the 
military domain, with few bilateral military agreements and no formal alliances between 
them. Why have these two countries been so distant in their military relations, while 
being so closed in economic and social terms? Why have these two economic partners 
been unable to become military allies? Why is military cooperation with Mexico so 
difficult to achieve? 
To answer to these questions, this thesis analyzes U.S.-Mexico relations from an 
historical perspective and assesses how bilateral military cooperation has evolved since 
World War II. The thesis finds that World War II brought increased U.S.-Mexican 
military cooperation, as Mexico supported the U.S. war effort by deploying soldiers to 
the Asian theatre and allowing U.S. troops to use Mexican territory and bases for 
American forces. Cooperation was even institutionalized with the establishment of the 
Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission. Nevertheless, following the war, bilateral 
military cooperation returned to its traditional and distant phase. The United States 
focused its military efforts on Europe and Asia, while Mexico turned to domestic matters. 
In other words, after years of military cooperation, the United States and Mexico became 
distant neighbors. It was not until the mid-1990s that U.S. and Mexican political leaders 
revised the status of the bilateral relationship, leading to the entry into force of NAFTA in 
1994. However, even with such a strategic economic relationship, military cooperation 
remained limited, with few bilateral military interactions.  
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To explain why the U.S. and Mexico remained so distant in military matters, this 
thesis assessed two competing explanations available in the international relations 
literature, including neorealism and economic interdependence. Concerning the former, 
the thesis finds that common threats can only explain military cooperation during World 
War II, when both countries formed a common alliance to fight against a common 
enemy. However, the existence of external threats cannot account for why Mexico and 
the United States opted for such a distant relationship following the war. Clearly, both 
states faced common threats, including being targeted by Soviet nuclear missiles; but this 
was insufficient to maintain Mexico as an ally. Likewise, economic interdependence 
cannot explain why military-to-military cooperation remained so limited in the face of 
growing economic integration. Thus, the evidence suggests that military cooperation does 
not follow economic trends or international patterns. Ultimately, international relations 
theories are insufficient to explain in full the empirical puzzle identified in this thesis. 
The thesis then focuses on domestic politics to explain the lack of military 
cooperation in U.S.-Mexico relations. It does so by paying special attention to how civil-
military relations in Mexico shape policy preferences and incentives for cooperation. In 
particular, the Mexican military’s political autonomy and its segregated status from the 
foreign policy establishment is the strongest limitation to increased military interaction 
with the United States. Segregation entails the explicit and sometimes tacit separation of 
tasks, roles, and assignments regarding defense and foreign policy issues. For all practical 
purposes, the military rarely, if ever, participates in the foreign policy decision-making 
process. Hence, segregation incites an inward-looking approach to security matters within 
the military establishment. 
On the other hand, the armed forces’ political autonomy also impedes higher 
levels of military cooperation with the United States. The Mexican military enjoys 
doctrinal, budgetary, acquisitions, and mission autonomy, allowing it to formulate its 
own policies and determine its own destiny with virtually no civilian oversight. The 
absence of civilian control impedes convergence with civilian authorities and limits 
interoperability with U.S. forces. As Craig Deare argues, the United States has “no 
civilian counterparts in Mexico” and thus, cannot fully cooperate with Mexico at the 
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strategic level.130 Consequently, civil-military relations in Mexico exercise an important 
negative effect on the bilateral relationship by affecting the incentives to cooperate on 
military affairs.  
Thus, what can Mexico and the United States do to bring military cooperation to 
the level where it is needed? Since the absence of civilian control and accountability in 
Mexico is an obstacle to increased cooperation, it seems natural that one way in which 
the United States may be able to affect preferences is by supporting efforts to increase 
military transparency in Mexico. This transparency may be achieved by educating 
civilians on defense matters to develop civilian expertise in military affairs. Likewise, the 
United States can support Mexico’s war on drugs, via the Merida initiative, conditioned 
on the Mexican government meeting basic requirements on democratic civilian control. 
This policy of providing carrots in exchange for domestic reform has been used in the 
past, when the United States supported NATO’s enlargement in Eastern Europe, provided 
the new members fulfilled basic transparency requirements. Similarly, Washington can 
assist in engaging civil society by supporting local non-governmental organizations and 
journalists interested in monitoring the armed forces. Finally, programs, such as the 
International Military Education and Training program, may help the process by 
educating and socializing young Mexican officers into new roles and democratic norms 
compatible with civilian control.  
Nevertheless, even with these initiatives, achieving full military-to-military 
cooperation in U.S.-Mexico relations is likely to take some time, since the main source of 
change lies in Mexico’s own domestic politics. Civilian control cannot be imposed, and 
hence, the main impetus for military reform must come from within Mexico. 
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